land from debt-ridden peasants, either by purchasing the peasants' fields outright or by foreclosing on mortgages. The records of the great exchange fill page after page of notarial registers, and it was obvious enough to have attracted the attention of contemporaries. In Lyon, for instance, the local historian and minor humanist Guillaume Paradin described in 1573 how the city's wealthy merchants and bankers had been buying land from peasants at bargain prices:
The poor laboureurs, lacking enough to eat, were constrained to put their lands up for sale at rock bottom prices to rich people, who thereby acquired good lands and vineyards for a morsel of bread. In this way, many have built beautiful farms and villas, constructing their country houses upon the misery of paupers. Figures for 1388, 1493, and 1517-1518 were taken from Lyon tax records, which give the area of holdings belonging to residents of Lyon. For 1687 and 1787, Phad to rely upon terriers, as reported in Durand. The terriers concern only land that was subject to the seignior-a major portion of the community but not all of it. Hence, acreage totals for the terriers are not directly comparable to the earlier area totals. The figures for 1493 and 1517 differ slightly from those given in Lorcin, p. 395 Toulouse, 1973), pp. 196-98, 206-9, 242-48 But the sales of land continued."
8 Jacquart, "Immobilisme," pp. 250-52.
9 Three tithe series and one series of farm harvest records from various regions of France suggest that gross revenues were no higher in the years 1550-1730 than before or after. For two of the series the coefficients of variation of gross revenues were in fact lower in 1550-1730 than before or after, and in the other two series, although the coefficients of variation were higher, the differences were so slight that they were not significant, even at the 0.25 probability level. (Here gross revenues are defined as tithe collections times price for the tithe series and harvest times price for the harvest series.) Using deviations from a moving average of gross revenues led to similar results. Gross revenues, of course, are not profits, and tithe records always pose problems. The fluctuations of gross revenues, though, ought to have accounted for most of the variation of profits, and the tithe records used are better than most. They were collected annually in kind, and they come from holdings where the area farmed and the tithe rate did not vary significantly. Similarly, it is not enough to invoke the security and prestige that property ownership conferred to explain the land sales. Owning property undoubtedly fulfilled a variety of nonpecuniary desires, but there is no reason to believe that these became more pronounced after 1550, and less pronounced after 1730. Furthermore the nobles, officers, and privileged bourgeois who bought farm land seemed often more concerned about profits than one might have supposed. Consider, for example, the illustrious Gadagne family from Lyon. Enormously wealthy, they purchased estates in Saint-Genis-Laval and other parts of the Lyonnais. They were singled out by Marc Bloch as a banking and mercantile family which abandoned trade for the greater status (and eventual ennoblement) that seigniories and rural properties conferred. It is true that the Gadagnes bought seigniories and chateaux, and filled their home in Saint-Genis-Laval with expensive furniture and works of
art. Yet they made a great effort to round out their agricultural holdings, as if they were concerned about economies of scale in administration, and they invested considerable money in converting grain fields to more profitable vineyards. To say that the Gadagnes and other officers and merchants among the land buyers were merely aping the older military nobility's taste for chateaux is unsatisfactory. Although they did purchase an occasional chateau, they also bought considerable amounts of peasant land, which carried none of the honor of a seigniory. And they paid too much attention to the business of estate management and campagne. In the Les paysans de Languedoc, vol. 1, pp. 567-81, Le Roy Ladurie abandons population growth and fragmentation as explanations for purchases of land by urban elites after the mid-seventeenth century. The reason is that by this time the population was declining in Languedoc and fragmentation had ceased. By his logic, though, the sales to elites should have stopped as well.
12 Georges Durand, Vin, vigne, vignerons en lyonnais et beaujolais (Lyon, 1979), pp. 225-50, 363-86, 445-62, 507-10. This content Nobility (Princeton, 1980) . One could argue that the tightening of the market for government offices pushed members of the privileged elite to buy land, but the cost of offices did not rise until the end of the sixteenth century, well after land sales began. Nor do office prices explain the end of the land sales in 1730. Similarly, the fluctuations in the value of other investments, such as rentes, do not appear to explain the sales, and it would be difficult to argue that the security of land, albeit considerable, suddenly increased after 1550 and thereby attracted money into the countryside.
14 In areas of taille reevle, where tax exemptions were tied not to persons but to pieces of land, privileged persons would (at least in theory) have paid the taille on land purchased from commoners. In practice, though, they too often escaped with low tax assessments.
'5 Gascon, Grand commerce, vol. Crushed by the higher taxes, peasant proprietors sold out to privileged investors. They in turn were willing to purchase the land (and willing to pay more for it than any peasant) because it allowed them to exploit their tax exemptions. As Vauban remarked in 1707, the exemptions raised the value of the privileged investors' property relative to land held by tax-paying peasants-which presumably dropped in price every time the taille was raised. French Agrarian Taxes 47
The exemptions were large enough to affect land prices appreciably.
As early as the fifteenth century the annual exemptions from the aides enjoyed by a typical magistrate of the Parlement of Paris might be worth a quarter of his yearly salary, and they would have been worth more under the higher taxes of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 9 The tax exemptions, further, could account for the land sales even if a privileged buyer was concerned only about his social status: a tax exemption would make a prestigious estate less costly to operate.
A bit of economics will explain why the land sales finally came to a halt. In the long run one would expect a peasant to pay for land an amount equal to the net revenue it brought in. For a given piece of land he would pay the discounted value of the net pre-tax revenue he received from the land, minus the taxes he had to pay. The same would hold for a privileged landlord, but he would face different costs and much smaller taxes, if indeed he paid taxes at all. As an absentee, the privileged landlord bore the additional cost of overseeing the land and its tenants-disposing of crops from afar, supervising laborers, and ensuring that tenants paid their rent and did not abuse buildings, trees, or animals. The costs of supervision, which an owner-occupier such as a peasant did not have to pay, were of great concern to contemporaries, and they could loom large enough to make a distant plot of land worthless for an absentee owner.20
As long as the supervisory costs were low a privileged investor would pay more for a piece of land than a peasant because of his lower taxes, Given the structure of exemptions, the taxes peasants faced were bound to increase more than the taxes levied on the privileged, and each tax increase would therefore encourage the privileged to buy more land, until the costs of administering distant estates once again balanced the tax exemptions. The process would come to a halt only when taxes ceased to grow, or when the government limited exemptions. In real terms, per capita taxes dropped temporarily after 1690, and after reaching a peak again in the 1730s they leveled off until late in the eighteenth century (Table 2, 23 For tax reform and the campaign against exemptions, see Marion, Les imp6ts, pp. [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] 127, 129, 131, Deyon, "Rapports, Bonney, Political Change, 433, Mousnier, Institutions, vol. 1, p. 172, vol. 2, The risks of agricultural lending were high. It is not enough merely to cite evidence of high interest rates in order to conclude that moneylenders were monopolistic usurers or that credit markets had failed. In Saint-Genis-Laval, for example, where many peasants themselves engaged in money lending, the market for loans was fairly competitive, I'imp6t, vol. 2, pp. 357-59, 619-20, vol. 3, p. 41 further restricted exemptions, for, whatever their failings, these indirect taxes and the vingtieme were less riddled with loopholes than the taille. Taille rolls from Normandy also suggest that by the eighteenth century, tenants of privileged landlords no longer evaded the taille; see, for example, Archives dept. de la Seine Maritime, C 2108, Nossonville (1727).
and it is therefore difficult to trace the loss of peasant land in SaintGenis back to failures of credit markets.25
In the few areas of France where the privileged could not readily exploit tax exemptions, the transfer of peasant land into their hands should be insignificant. Lower Provence is one such area. Cheating on taille assessments was uncommon there, and the peasants did not usually sell their land.26 There is more dramatic evidence of this sort in Venissieux, a village south of Lyon, across the Rhone River from SaintGenis-Laval. Although Venissieux was no further from Lyon than Saint-Genis, the privileged investors from Lyon behaved differently in Venissieux than in Saint-Genis, where they had been acquiring property throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (see Table 1 ). The only way to explain the contrast between the two communities is to invoke differences between the local tax systems. Venissieux lay just By the 1640s, after a long court battle, they had moved toward a more equitable tax system, which allowed even nobles to be taxed.27
25 Le Roy Ladurie "Vraie croissance," pp. 594; Freche, Toulouse, pp. 140, 164, 504; Bloch, French Rural History, p. 140 . The evidence from Saint-Genis-Laval comes from research I am doing in local notarial records from Archives dept. du Rh6ne, 3 E. Even with a number of lenders in Saint-Genis-Laval, the problem of default might have introduced imperfections into the credit market. Although this matter of peasant debt occupies a large place in the social history of the period, it is largely irrelevant to my explanation for the land sales. Whether a peasant owner was driven into debt by taxes or not, the higher price offered by the privileged would make him sell his land to them instead of to other peasants.
26 Baehrel, Une croissance, pp. 403-6, 476-77. In areas where the privileged could exploit tax exemptions, the price of land should have remained relatively insensitive to increases in taxes, for when taxes rose, the amount the privileged would pay for land would have declined slightly, if at all. In areas like lower Provence, by contrast, land prices should have dropped considerably whenever taxes increased. The problem with testing this, however, is the nearly insurmountable one of getting a long time series of land prices or rents that controls for land quality and a matching series of local tax figures. According to the taille roles, the absentee landlords from Lyon owned less property in Venissieux in 1661 than in 1543-1544 (Table 3) . One hesitates, of course, to translate the taille directly into landholdings, for elites could manipulate the assessments. The Lyonnais, however, lacked the political and legal tools to engage in such trickery in Dauphine (if anything, they were likely to be overassessed), and in any event they were probably less able to influence the taille rolls as time went on. In all likelihood, then, the taille rolls from Venissieux probably understate the decline in property ownership by the Lyonnais. By contrast, in Saint-Genis-Laval, just across the river, the Lyonnais were buying up more and more land ( Table 1 ). The explanation is clearly the tax exemption.
The tax exemptions also shed light on the growing stratification in peasant communities. The sort who rose in the peasant communities were in the first place those who had the skills to farm or to manage estates for the growing number of absentee landlords. They had the assets, reputation, and experience needed to be an absentee landlord's agent, or fermier; the relationship they enjoyed with landlords might bring them lower tax assessments as well. If they were literate they might also purchase minor tax-exempt offices. Most important, they usually had a stranglehold over village and seigniorial offices, which allowed them to manipulate tax assessments and other village affairs in their favor. The result was that wealthy peasants-the coqs du village, marchands-laboureurs, or fermiers-receveurs-profited. In particular they usually paid lower taxes. They acquired farm land and rose in the village, while most other peasants lost their property and fell.28
28 For the stratification of the rural community, see Le Roy Ladurie, Paysans de Languedoc, vol. 1, Jacquart, idem, "Immobilisme", p. 261; Bloch, French Rural History, . For the village elite's ability to gain tax exemptions and manipulate tax assessments (either on their own or via the patronage of absentee landlords), see Esmonin, La taille, pp. 151, 160, and Bonney, Political Change, pp. 181, For the small offices a member of the village elite might buy, see Mousnier, Venalite, Similarly, although the excise on beer in England may have reduced the demand for barley a bit, it was also part of a system of protection that guarded British farmers against foreign competition.
The key here, of course, is not per capita taxation, but the incidence of taxes and their effect at the margin, and as Adam Smith noted, French taxes, though apparently lower by the eighteenth century on a per capita basis, were far more oppressive. See Mathias and O'Brien, "Taxation," pp.
614-17, 621-25; Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed.
Edwin Cannan, 2 vols. in 1 (Chicago, 1976), vol. 2, pp. 352-58, 365, 437-38; C. D. Chandaman, The English Public Revenue, 1660 -1688 (Oxford, 1975 , pp. 9-76, 188-91; W. R. Ward, The English Land Tax in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 1953), pp. 3-7, 20-22, 34-35, 67, 87-88, 93-97. This content downloaded from 131. 
